2
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Although it is not clear, it appears that definition 5 of this paper,
page 10 of this paper, and page 6 of this paper, each assume
that the honest parties will all use the same security parameter.

Are there any known constructions of concurrent non-malleable
commitment that do not assume a common security parameter?

(If I'm wrong about the first sentence in this post, then
one of those three papers might be such a construction.)


I notice that, by rounding to a value of the form $2^\left(2^n\right)\hspace{-0.02 in}$,$\:$ one can assume without
loss of generality that at most $\:O\hspace{.01 in}(1)\:$ different security parameters will be used.

Improve this question
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  • $\begingroup$ I've never seen a paper that considered the case of non-matching security parameters for any primitive. Is this motivated by anything in particular? $\endgroup$
    – David Cash
    Commented Jul 16, 2013 at 2:00
  • $\begingroup$ It's just motivated by me noticing that this would be needed in order to avoid being $\hspace{.61 in}$ "locked in" to a particular security parameter as computational abilities increase. $\;\;\;$ $\endgroup$
    – user6973
    Commented Jul 16, 2013 at 2:20

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