We can write ${\mathsf {NP}}-{\mathsf P}= {\mathsf {NPC}}\cup {\mathsf {NPI}}$ where ${\mathsf {NPC}}$ is the set of ${\mathsf {NP}}$-complete languages (not in ${\mathsf {P}}$ by this partition), and ${\mathsf {NPI}}$ contains the ${\mathsf {NP}}$-intermediate ones. Assuming ${\mathsf P}\neq {\mathsf {NP}}$, both ${\mathsf {NPC}}$ and ${\mathsf {NPI}}$ are known nonempty.
There is, however, a kind of strange asymmetry between ${\mathsf {NPC}}$ and ${\mathsf {NPI}}$. Under the hypothesis ${\mathsf P}\neq {\mathsf {NP}}$, we know not only that both sets are nonempty, but we also have plenty of natural problems that are provably in ${\mathsf {NPC}}$. On the other hand, to my knowledge, there is not a single natural problem that has been proven to fall in ${\mathsf {NPI}}$, under the same ${\mathsf P}\neq {\mathsf {NP}}$ hypothesis.
Note: Even though there are quite a few natural candidates for ${\mathsf {NPI}}$ status, none of them has been proven to be in ${\mathsf {NPI}}$ under the ${\mathsf P}\neq {\mathsf {NP}}$ hypothesis, as far as I know. The highly artificial construction provided by Ladner's Theorem does not qualify for a natural problem.
Thus, assuming ${\mathsf P}\neq {\mathsf {NP}}$, the set ${\mathsf {NPC}}$ is teeming with natural examples, while for ${\mathsf {NPI}}$ we do not know even a single natural problem that is guaranteed to fall in the set under the same hypothesis. What could explain this strange asymmetry? Why is ${\mathsf {NPI}}$ so "thin" in this informal sense?