Under the Curry–Howard correspondence, types can be thought of as propositions, and values inhabiting a type can be thought of as proofs that the corresponding proposition is true. (E.g., the Cartesian product is logical conjunction.)
Negation is represented as $A \to \bot$, where $\bot$ is the empty type. This works because if a type is inhabited, there can't be any function $A \to \bot$ (if you do you have such a function and the type is inhabited, feed the value into it and you get an element of the empty type, hence a contradiction), and vice versa (if $A$ is empty, the empty function $A \to \bot$ exists).
But once you add continuations to your language, an $A$-continuation can also be given the type $A \to \bot$. (see e.g. the symmetric lambda calculus). This apparently provides computational meaning to classical theorems; for example, the $\mathcal{C}$-operator (a basic operator for manipulating continuations), has type $\neg\neg A \to A$.
But can't you have continuations for non-empty types? If you add continuations, does $\neg A$ no longer express "$A$ is-empty/is-false/has-no-proofs"? It can't, right? This formulation makes an inhabitant of $\mathbb{N} \to \bot$ axiomatic, and $\mathbb{N}$ certainly isn't uninhabited. So what does "$\neg A$" actually express, if not "$A$ is-empty/is-false/has-no-proof"? And how do you actually express "$A$ is-empty/is-false/has-no-proof" when continuations exist?