This is a follow up to Quantum complexity of TQBF, trying to model the situation where we have good heuristics.
Let $L$ be the language of true, fully alternating totally quantified boolean formulas with some number $n$ of variables and circuit size $s = \operatorname{poly}(n)$. The classical complexity of $L$ is $\tilde{O}\left(2^{0.793n}\right)$, and the quantum complexity is $\tilde{O}\left(2^{n/2}\right)$.
Now we assume we have access to an untrusted oracle for all subnodes of a particular formula $F \in L$. That is, if the oracle is honest it will give the correct value of $F$ where any prefix of quantified variables is replaced by a chosen assignment of $\{0,1\}$ values. We seek an algorithm which is correct for all oracles, untrustworthy or not, and ask for its worst-case complexity conditional on the oracle being honest.
In the classical case, I believe alpha-beta pruning is the optimal algorithm, and achieves complexity roughly $\tilde{O}\left(2^{n/2}\right)$. (I'm not certain of this, so confirmation would be appreciated.) Note that this matches the quantum complexity if we don't have an oracle.
Question: What is the quantum complexity of $L$ given an untrusted oracle, where complexity is measured conditional on the oracle being honest?
Motivation: The goal here is to model the situation where we have some particular TQBF, such as arising from chess or go, where there is enough structure that efficient, accurate heuristics are available but not enough structure to turn those heuristics into a rigorous proof of the game value. In practice the heuristics would not be perfect (as in the honest oracle case), so this question is trying to get at a lower bound for the practical situation.