My understanding of András' answer is that, while it gets the gist correct, his final conclusion is not quite right: The "standard" way to determine the strength of the function space in a logical calculus, like CoC is traditionally via realizability, as was used by Girard to justify the strength of $\mathrm{HA}_2$ having exactly the nat -> nat
functions of system F as definable functions.
However in CoC, it's possible to directly look at the proof terms, and "erase" parts of it to obtain system $\mathrm{F}_\omega$ terms, which have the same reduction behavior in the case of nat -> nat
functions. This is done in detail in section 5.3 of Barendregt's Lambda Calculi with Types, which he attributes to Berardi.
I suspect a realizability argument along the lines of the one given by Berger and Hou in A realizability interpretation of Church's simple theory of types would additionally show that all of Church's simple type theory can be accounted for, i.e. the provably definable functions of that theory are exactly those definable in system $\mathrm{F}_\omega$.
This would mean that there are strictly more such functions in CoC than in system F, by some standard Gödelian argument.
Why does this not contradict the conjecture András refers to? I actually asked this to Pawel Uzyczyn a while back: the question asked there is actually about which untyped terms can be assigned some type in various systems. There is no guarantee that $\mathrm{F}_\omega$ and $\mathrm{F}_1$ would assign the same type, much less the type nat -> nat
! As such, the question is more about type assignment systems than logical theories.